

# ALL THE WIKILEAKS CLASSIFIED CABLES RELATING TO BANGLADESH

P 031812Z NOV 08  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO SECURITY OFFICER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY  
INFO AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY  
XMT AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG  
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG

SECRET STATE 116943

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: MR  
TAGS: ASEC  
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY

Classified By: Derived from Multiple Sources

SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//MR  
Declassify on: Source marked 25X1-human, Date of source:  
October 30, 2008

. (U) Diplomatic Security Daily, November 1-3, 2008

(U) Threats & Analysis ) Paragraphs 19-31

29. (S//FGI//NF) SCA - Bangladesh - Rejection of IDP to

Bangladesh - Rejection of IDP to register for December elections: As of late October, the Bangladeshi Election Commission was set to reject the Islamic Democratic Party,s (IDP,s) attempt to register for the December parliamentary elections. The IDP is a nascent political party formed by senior members of the Islamic terrorist group Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh

(HUJI-B). Bangladesh's Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) supported the formation of the IDP as a way to bring HUJI-B into the mainstream and reported it tightly monitored the group's activities; although, HUJI-B has never renounced the use of violence to implement its vision of transforming Bangladesh into a Muslim theocracy. According to U.S. Embassy Dhaka, which strongly opposed the creation of the IDP, the party and its leadership will likely be angered by the decision and may respond with violence possibly against the commission or the U.S. Mission or interests.

¶30. (S//NF) Arrests and monitoring have undoubtedly hindered HUJI-B's capabilities in recent years, and it is entirely plausible the group is pursuing the creation of a political wing to improve its ability to support and carry out terrorist activity. A late-September assessment from Bangladesh's National Security Intelligence Organization (NSI) voiced concern that the party's creation would free extremists to pursue extremist activity under the cover of a moderate front organization. Indeed, there are no indications IDP would garner a significant number of votes. Analysis from the DoS, Office of Research noted the majority of Bangladeshis want Awami League and Bangladesh National Party leaders Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia to participate in the December elections. Interestingly, 80 percent stated they would ignore a call by either party to boycott the vote. One-third further stated they would join street protests in the face of a cancellation of elections.

31. (S//FGI/NF) Although there is little information available regarding HUJI-B's current capabilities, its membership likely does retain the ability to manufacture and use explosives and has previously favored targeting high-profile individuals for attack. While there is no specific reporting at the present time detailing plots against U.S. interests in Bangladesh, the group has publicly articulated its anti-Western and -Indian stance, including signing Usama Bin Ladin's 1998 fatwa against the West. In regards to HUJI-B's capabilities, DGFI's, Rapid Action Battalion's (RAB's), and NSI's assessments vary significantly. Following the early-March U.S. designation of HUJI-B as a foreign terrorist organization, RAB assessed HUJI-B would not respond with violence due to the severe degradation of the group's capability and leadership structure from arrests and active surveillance. Some member

who wanted to independently attack Western interests, however, remained technically capable of carrying out low-level attacks using small arms, grenades, and IEDs. DGFI likewise reported HUJI-B was an organization on the run and that it did not pose a threat to U.S. interests in Bangladesh. NSI conversely assessed HUJI-B would react violently to the designation and would attempt to conduct an attack against the U.S. official presence in Dhaka; although, there was no information available detailing such an operation. Thus far, HUJI-B has not carried out an attack against American interests in Bangladesh, but the group has been linked to assassination attempts on intellectuals, journalists, and politicians, including two thwarted attempts on the life of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina during public addresses and a grenade attack that injured the British high commissioner in May 2004. (Bangladeshis have high hopes for national elections,8 DoS Office of Research; Appendix sources 29-40)

U.S. Embassy Dhaka officials met with the secretary of Home Affairs to discuss concerns over an uptick in crimes directed against foreigners in Dhaka's Diplomatic Enclave. The secretary stated the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) had increased the police presence in the enclave May 7, when threat letters were sent to several diplomatic missions. Post officials will continue to monitor the situation and keep pressure on the GoB to provide adequate security to the U.S. Mission. (Appendix source 14)

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Meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for South and Southeast Asia Robert Scher. Ghafoor expressed appreciation for the warm reception he had been receiving in Washington. He said that Maldivian soldiers and police (many now senior staff officials) that were trained by the U.S. have earned the respect of both the government and the citizens of Maldives. (NOTE: Ghafoor's brother is a retired director of the Maldivian National Defense Force. END NOTE.) He said he looked forward to continued cooperation in this field. Scher asked how U.S. training STATE 00018437 003 OF 003 compared with that of India in terms of quantity and quality. Ghafoor said that both were substantive and substantial. He acknowledged that

Maldives also interacts with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, as one might expect of a 100 percent Muslim country situated in the region. Scher indicated that the U.S. did not want to get in the way of Maldivian relationships with its neighbors. Ghafoor assessed that New Delhi's perception of the U.S. has evolved and that Male would be able to address any concerns. He stated that his government would not let relations with India impact relations with the United States, reflecting Maldives's attempt to "show balance" in the past. Ghafoor replied that, if necessary, Maldives would explain that neither India nor Pakistan need suspect anything "untoward." Ghafoor also noted that young people can receive free education (in Islamic Studies) in Egypt and Pakistan. Scher asked if all of the students return to Maldives after their studies. Ghafoor said that some had been apprehended in round ups in Pakistan, where they had been recruited by extremists. He said he believed that such exposure led to a rise in fundamentalist views within Maldives's peaceful and tolerant culture. "It used to be simply a question of faith; now you must show that you are more Muslim than others," he said. Increased access to liberal western education would help to combat growing fundamentalist trends, he suggested. Scher pointed out that that some groups would hope to exploit this lack of education, and that it was good to hear that Maldivian authorities were actively monitoring the situation. Ghafoor acknowledged that human rights must allow for freedom of expression and said Maldives is looking for guidance on how to peaceably marry two often conflicting agendas, freedom and internal security. Scher replied that hatred is better faced head-on by a benevolent government rather than pushed underground. 8. (SBU) Ghafoor noted that drug use in Maldives has led to a rise in crime that President Nasheed has pledged to combat with prevention and rehabilitation. In the past, criminals were simply "banished" to a different island. He inquired about training assistance with management of prison facilities and the training of correctional officers. Scher pointed out that this would be a matter better addressed by State/INL, DOJ and USAID. Ghafoor noted that 99 percent of Maldives is extremely vulnerable to attack from the sea. More specifically, he said that an attack (such as by Somali pirates) on an island resort would cripple the country's economy. Maldives is seeking additional equipment and training from the U.S. on customs and border security. Scher expressed DOD's interest in expanding bilateral defense and security engagement, continuing training, and helping build the Maldives's maritime security capabilities to counteract the threat from terrorism, piracy, and trafficking. CLINTON

Summary: On April 23-24, Treasury Assistant

## Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes

Sipdis

Patrick O'Brien met with senior GOK officials on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism finance (AML/CTF) issues. He conveyed USG concerns about the activities of the Kuwait-based charity the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS), specifically the activities of branches in Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Cambodia, Russia, Somalia, and Thailand. O'Brien urged the GOK to demonstrate support for international counterterrorism efforts by withdrawing its appeal to Qatar and allowing the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee to designate three Kuwaiti terrorist facilitators: Jaber Al-Jalahmah, Hamid Al-Ali, and Mubarak Al-Bathali, designated by the U.S. in December 2006, pursuant to E.O. 13224. O'Brien also pressed for the swift adoption of a revised draft money laundering law that will criminalize terrorist financing, create inbound and outbound cash reporting requirements encompassing all ports of entry and exit, and allow the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to receive Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) directly from banks rather than going through the Office of the Public Prosecutor (OPP). In addition, he discussed the potential for further USG technical assistance on cash couriers.

Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes Patrick O'Brien visited Kuwait for meetings with senior GOK officials to discuss AML/CTF issues, charities -- specifically RIHS -- and UNSCR 1267. In a two-hour long meeting with xxxxxxxxxxxx,

Kuwait 00000808 002 of 007

O'Brien expressed concern about RIHS and passed xxxxxxxxxxxx a non-paper on its activities (ref A). O'Brien noted that the USG has shared information on RIHS activities with the GOK since 2002 and that non-papers were passed to the GOK on numerous occasions detailing ongoing RIHS terrorist support activities. O'Brien conveyed USG intentions to pursue domestic and UN designations of eight RIHS branch offices: Somalia and Thailand. O'Brien described enforcement actions taken by the governments of Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Pakistan, and Russia against RIHS branch offices. He added that the USG is working with foreign governments that have RIHS branches of concern to gather

additional evidence and pass to the GOK.

(S/NF) xxxxxxxxxxxx made the following specific points:

- Bangladesh: xxxxxxxxxxxx asserted that USG charges are different from those of the GOB. "The USG non-paper said RIHS' accounts were frozen while in reality the Bangladesh NGO Office renewed RIHS' registration for another 5 years in November 2006," he stated. He added that the GOK has been told RIHS projects in Bangladesh are going well. (Note: the two issues are separate, and restrictions on RIHS Bangladesh's bank accounts should merit more concern by the GOK. The government of Bangladesh canceled RIHS's license on May 18. End Note).

(S/NF) Briefing MOSAL on ref A and passing ref B non-papers, O'Brien reiterated concern about RIHS activities and said that the USG is looking into taking domestic and UN action against these eight branches in the near future. In addressing O'Brien's concerns about RIHS activities abroad, xxxxxxxxxxxx explained that while MOSAL oversees charitable operations inside Kuwait, it continues to rely on the MFA to oversee charities' external activities. External RIHS projects must be endorsed by both the host government and the local Kuwaiti Embassy before they receive GOK approval, as was the case in Bangladesh. He conceded, however, that this puts pressure on Kuwaiti embassy officials, especially those in Africa and Asia. xxxxxxxxxxxx thanked the USG for encouraging the exchange of information on RIHS noting that the GOK has been waiting for a response from the Russians for eight months. In response to the ref B non-paper on the three Kuwaiti terrorist facilitators, he noted that the GOK is aware of these individuals and is following this matter through an interagency committee. (Comment: This is the first we have heard of this committee. We will pursue with the GOK. End comment).

Summary: On April 23-24, Treasury Assistant (RIHS), specifically the activities of branches in Albania,

(U) Kuwait talking points

(S/REL USA, KWT) We appreciate the breadth and depth of our strong bilateral relationship. We would like to see our cooperation on counter-terrorist financing improve to a level that matches our excellent cooperation in many other areas. In this respect, the recent Kuwait anti-money laundering conference held in Kuwait is a positive step forward.

(S/REL USA, KWT) Our information indicates that Kuwaiti donors serve as an important source of funds and other support for al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups. The arrest in August of six Kuwaiti men who were plotting terrorist attacks on U.S. and Kuwait interests marks an important step in enhanced counterterrorism cooperation. We encourage you to keep up the positive momentum.

(S/REL USA, KWT) We underscore that the Taliban and LeT are aligned with al-Qaida and that your government's support for disrupting the financing of these groups is critical to the stability of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the broader Central and South Asian region. We emphasize the need to prevent the Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to raise funds.

(S/REL USA, KWT) We appreciate your government's generosity for a wide range of important causes and for the positive contributions made by Kuwaiti charities. We commend Kuwait for some of the initiatives taken to enhance oversight of charitable donations, but we need you to do more to prevent the financing of terrorism abroad from Kuwaiti soil.

(S/REL USA, KWT) Our goal is to work more closely with your government to separate and protect legitimate charitable activity from those that fund terror. We have particular concerns about their foreign activities.

(S/REL USA, KWT) We remain concerned that the continued absence of counterterrorism legislation criminalizing terrorist financing will continue to prevent effective counterterrorist efforts.

(S/REL USA, KWT) We urge your government to prioritize the passage of counterterror finance legislation. Robust and comprehensive anti-money laundering and counterterror financing laws will enhance your government's ability to prosecute those seeking to undermine Kuwait's security, but will also enhance the reputation of Kuwait's financial sector as a whole.

(S/REL USA, KWT) If raised, Kuwait RIHS: We have shared our concerns with your government regarding RIHS on numerous occasions. We designated the organization in the United States as a specially designated terrorist entity based on information that RIHS funds have supported terrorist groups in various regions of the world. The USG is not alone in its concern; six other governments (Albania, Azerbaijan,

Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Russia) have taken enforcement action against RIHS branches in their countries.  
(S//REL USA, KWT) We would welcome the opportunity to work more closely with you to ensure that RIHS and other charities cannot be used to support terrorists.

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PARIS  
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 PARIS 001568

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 08/13/2018  
TAGS PREL, PINR, ECON, MARR, PHUM, XA, FR  
SUBJECT: FRANCE'S CHANGING AFRICA POLICY: PART II (FRENCH IMPLEMENTATION AND AFRICAN REACTIONS)

REF: PARIS 1501

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone, 1.4 (b/ d).  
(C) Some Africans have disapproved of another part of Sarkozy's immigration policy -- the program to test DNA to verify kinship as a basis for immigration. Legislation for such a program was initiated when Sarkozy was at Interior and has since been enacted after overcoming legal and political obstacles. African reaction has been negative, with one article -- from Mali in October 2007 -- capturing Africans, dismay: "We have known, since the Second World War, after the success of our ancestors, the Senegalese riflemen, in the liberation of France from the hands of Nazi Germany, that our compatriots along with so many other Africans have no longer been welcome on the banks of the Seine. But to go so far as to examine the blood of people to control the migratory flow represents an unqualified case of cynicism and lowers France to the level of nations where racism gains more and more ground."

(C) The DNA testing program appears to be going forward. In June 2008, Hortefeux announced during a visit to Cape Verde that France would begin its first pilot program there in September. Cape Verde is one of nine countries (with Angola, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, and Pakistan) where France plans to start

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FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0864  
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000716

EO 12958 DECL: 05/22/2019  
TAGS PREL, PTER, EFIN, AF, PK, SA  
SUBJECT: SAUDI INTERIOR MINISTRY BRIEFS SPECIAL ADVISOR  
HOLBROOKE AND TREASURY DAS GLASER ON TERRORISM FINANCE

REF: RIYADH 702

Classified By: CDA DAVID RUNDELL, 1.4 (b),(d)  
Key points:

-- (SBU) Special Advisor Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and Treasury DAS Glaser were briefed on Saudi terror finance efforts at a May 16 meeting with Interior Ministry (MOI) officials at the Security Forces Officers Club in Riyadh. Holbrooke also received a briefing on Saudi counterterrorism strategies (reftel).

(C) Holbrooke noted that Pakistan was also a center for terrorist financing through Islamic charities and asked whether the Saudis were monitoring the large Pakistani community in Saudi Arabia, and whether the Saudis were consulting with the governments of Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh about the issue. xxxxxxxxxxx said the Saudis had detained numerous individuals from these countries and were seeking cooperation to investigate their activities. He added that "we talk to ISI (Pakistan's intelligence agency) and get a good response, but we think ten times before approaching them; things are changing there and we are advised to be careful." Political unrest and new ISI leadership were the principal changes, he said. As a result, he concluded, "We only trust face-to-face transmission of information." The MOI had shared information with ISI on Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia suspected of terror finance, but ISI had not responded.

S E C R E T LONDON 000027

DEPARTMENT FOR INR/I AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018  
TAGS: PINR KISL KPLS UK  
SUBJECT: UK MUSLIM DEMOGRAPHICS (C-RE8-02527)

REF: A. 08 STATE 128186  
B. LONDON DAILY REPORT 7-28-08

Classified By: Political Counselor Rick Mills, Jr. for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S/NF) Summary. Per reftel, this cable provides information on the demographics of the Muslim community in the UK. The last official UK census was in 2001 and much of what is provided below is a combination of census figures and subsequent estimates and surveys. Post notes that the information is incomplete and in many cases several years old. This is, however, the most current and accurate information available. Among the findings are that the UK Muslim population has jumped in seven years from 1.6 million to 2 million. At that rate of increase, HMG estimates that the Muslim population of the UK at the next census in 2011 will be over 2.2 million. End Summary.

#### Overall Muslim Population Growing But Rate Slowing

-- Muslims are the second least-likely of all religious groups to have been born in the UK, with the majority being born outside the UK; 46% were born in the UK, 39% were born in Asia (Pakistan - 18%; Bangladesh - 9%; India - 3%), 9% were born in Africa (Somalia - 2%; Kenya - 1%), and 4% were born in Europe outside the UK (Turkey - 3%, former Yugoslavian countries - 1%).

-- 74% of Muslims are from an Asian ethnic background (Pakistani - 43%, Bangladeshi - 16%, Indian - 8%, Other Asian - 6%), Almost 1.2 million Asian Muslims were living in Great Britain in 2001. Another 11% were from a White ethnic background, including 4% of White British origin and 7% from another White background (including Turkish, Cypriot, Arab and Eastern European). 6% of Muslims were of Black African origin, mainly from North and West Africa.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 24 STATE 080163

NOFORN  
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2034  
TAGS: PINR KSPR ECON KPKO KUNR  
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: THE UNITED  
NATIONS

REF: STATE 048489

Classified By: MICHAEL OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).

1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on the United Nations (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic information relating to the United Nations (paragraph 2).

A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the 2004 NHCD and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on the United Nations. The review produced a comprehensive list of strategic priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on the United Nations. The priorities should also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).

B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.

C. (S/NF) Important information often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review of this National HUMINT Collection Directive. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to

encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.

2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting:

A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community's collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC.

B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to : office and

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organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.

Operations on operational plans, including the ability of the UN and its member states to build capacity in Africa, including by working with the AU or other regional organizations and NGOs.

- Efforts by China, France, Iran, and others to gain influence in Africa via UN peace operations.
- Information on extent of support and capabilities for peace operations by the AU and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS).
- Official stance on deploying HIV positive troops and actual practice.
- Degree to which official peacekeeping reporting matches unofficial communications of events; views on those discrepancies.
- Views of African states that host peacekeepers regarding UN peacekeeping troops and troop contributing countries.

- Attitudes and intentions of Ghana and Rwanda concerning UN peace operations in Africa and perception of their relative ability to contribute to such efforts.
- Attitudes of other African States to Ghana/Rwanda participation and leadership.

Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, India, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe  
International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN  
Non-State Entities: Lord,s Resistance Army

personnel, or financial).

Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam  
International Organizations: AU, EU, UN